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Abstract
This paper outlines a real options approach to valuing those an-
nouncements which are made by firms outside of their legal require-
ments. From the firm’s perspective, information is disclosed only if the
manager of the firm is sufficiently certain that the market response to
the announcement will have a positive impact on the value of the firm.
When debt financing is possible we find that the manager adopts a
more transparent disclosure policy, thus violating the Modigliani-Miller
theorem on irrelevance of capital structure.
Keywords: Voluntary Disclosure, Real Options, Modigliani-Miller
Theorem.
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1 Introduction
Corporate voluntary disclosure has become an important element of capital
market dynamics in that it conveys value-relevant information for market pric-
ing (Wen [25]). As well as this, it typically contains information related to a
firm’s activities which may not be immediately stated in accounting reports.
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According to Dempster [4], the issue has become increasingly topical and im-
portant in the aftermath of some major corporate scandals such as Enron,
WorldCom and others. Such events have raised concerns over the transparency
of U.S. firms and, in particular, the quality of their financial reporting and dis-
closures. This paper demonstrates how a real options approach to valuation
can contribute to our understanding of corporate disclosure, and in particular,
voluntary corporate disclosure which is concerned with those announcements
willingly made by firms which are outside of their legal and regulatory require-
ments.
One of the earliest findings in the disclosure literature, provided by Gross-
man and Hart [12] and Grossman [11], has become known as the “unraveling
result”. If the managers of firms, holding private information, choose not to
disclose their information to outside investors, then the investors will discount
the value of the firm down to the lowest possible value consistent with whatever
voluntary disclosure is made. Once the managers realize this, they will have
an incentive to make full disclosure. Dye [7], however, challenges this result,
and provides a reasoning for why it may not always hold. He shows that the
qualitative features of an optimal disclosure policy for management may take
the form of a policy dependent cutoff in which management disclose only if
the information is sufficiently good, otherwise they withhold disclosure. His
reasoning is due to the uncertainty of investors about the firm’s information
endowment; that is, investors may not be able to distinguish between managers
holding undisclosed information from managers being uninformed. In such a
setting, investors seeing non-disclosure must temper their inferences concern-
ing the likelihood of a manager having observed bad news and opting not to
disclose by the fact that non-disclosure may have arisen due to managers be-
ing uninformed. Since these early seminal contributions by Grossman [11] and
Dye [7], a large body of work has emerged on corporate voluntary disclosure.
Verrecchia [24] provides an extensive survey on such disclosure models.
The economic analysis of disclosures at its fundamental level investigates
voluntary disclosures. Even though provision of information, such as a publicly
traded company’s financial statements, is mandatory, the economic approach is
motivated by the observation that we can only assess the effect of mandatory
disclosures relative to the disclosures that would have arisen in the absence
of such regulation. Indeed Wen [25] demonstrates that the efficiency effect
of compulsory disclosure is contingent on the information required and the
economic environment.
One interpretation of voluntary announcements, says Dempster [4], “is that
they provide an opportunity for managers to communicate to the marketplace
that they are aware of, and up to date with, current investor demands and
interests”. She cites an example from Subramani and Walden [20], who, in
their study of the market impact of e-commerce announcements, argue that
“the reason for the significant positive abnormal returns that they found were
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in part because investors viewed announcement of such initiatives as favorable
signals of certain firm attributes”. Furthermore, Graham et al. [10] argue that
companies voluntarily disclose information to provide clarity to investors.
Importantly, across various streams of research investigating corporate dis-
closure, there is a growing recognition that the various announcements that
firms make have an inherent strategic value in their power to influence external
perceptions directly and firm performance indirectly (see Dempster [4]).
In principle, a firm can make an announcement about anything it chooses,
and thus, there is an infinite number of announcement applications. Examples
of such announcements include competitive pricing strategies, new product
introductions, various mergers, acquisitions and other alliances, and a range of
detailed structural changes within the firm. However, in practice, firms tend
to make announcements only about key strategic and organizational events
that could impact substantially on their value and success (see Dempster [4]
and Bayus et al. [2]).
In this paper we view voluntary disclosure of information relating to the
state of the firm to the marketplace as a (real) option held by the firm’s
manager. Exercising the option to disclose information is a strategic decision
on the part of the firm, which implies that the manager will only do so if
he is sufficiently certain that the payoffs are positive, i.e. that the option is
deep enough in the money. We measure the payoff to the disclosure option
by the impact of market response to the information on the value of the firm.
This reflects the standard corporate practise to (partly) remunerate managers
based on the firm’s stock market performance. This, effectively, aligns the
manager’s incentives with potential sellers of the firm’s equity. They, after all,
are interested in firm value to be as high as possible.
We also adapt the model to show that it provides an example of a violation
to the Modigliani–Miller theorem on irrelevance of capital structure on firm
value. With respect to the current setting, we show that when some of the
disclosure cost is financed with debt, the limited liability aspect of debt dom-
inates the loss to the firm from compensating the lender for expected default
losses, and consequently, the optimal disclosure threshold for the manager is
lower. As such, this is an interesting example where excess risk taking by
managers due to limited liability protection of debt financing actually has a
positive effect.
From a modelling point of view, our paper is most closely related to Thi-
jssen et al. [23] and Sabarwal [17]. The model of the arrival of imperfect
signals over time follows that of Thijssen et al. [23]. That paper analyzes the
problem of a firm with the opportunity to invest in a project which has an
uncertain profitability. They assume that there is no negative impact on firm
value through exercising their investment option. However, making such an
assumption in our set-up is not realistic. If the manager makes an announce-
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ment, the shareholders may react negatively and respond by selling off some
of their investment in the firm. This implies that disclosure may, indeed, have
a direct negative impact on firm value. This results in a lower threshold than
the threshold under their set-up. Sabarwal [17] shows how the ideas regarding
the value of the option to wait provide a violation to the Modigliani-Miller
theorem, but he deals with uncertainty using the standard framework of the
real options literature (see Dixit and Pindyck [5]), whereas in our model, un-
certainty is resolved over time and thus, standard stochastic calculus tools
cannot be used.
The paper is organized as follows; the benchmark model is described and
the optimal stopping problem for the disclosure threshold is solved in the
next section. Section 3 discusses some of the important features inherent in
the manager’s optimal disclosure policy. Section 4 analyses the model from
another dimension, namely if some of the disclosure costs are financed with
debt, and Section 5 finally concludes. All proofs appear in the Appendix.
2 The Model
2.1 Background and Motivation
Consider a firm that has invested in a new project and that the manager
receives private information over time pertaining to the project’s performance
(like, for example, sales figures). We assume that the firm’s management is not
legally obliged to disclose this information. Thus, the manager can exercise
discretion over whether to share his private information with the market or to
withhold it. His objective is to adopt a disclosure policy such that his own
current expected (discounted) utility from wealth is maximized.
It is assumed that the manager of the firm is uncertain about how the
private information he holds will be perceived by the market. The more pos-
itive are the signals he obtains, the more likely the market will interpret the
information favourably. Hence, each time a signal is obtained, the manager
updates his belief as to the likely market response in a Bayesian way. This
source of uncertainty is the same as that in Suijs [21], but differs with Dye [7] in
the sense that he assumes the uncertainty arises because the market is unsure
what, if any, information the manager has obtained. According to Suijs [21],
“the assumption of response uncertainty is necessary to prevent (extremely)
high returns from being disclosed, an act that would initiate the unravelling
process” described by Grossman and Hart [12].
Suijs [21] discusses several reasons why such response uncertainty may arise.
One such reason is that “the market can interpret the disclosed information
in different ways.” For example, he points out, in Dutta and Trueman [6],
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response uncertainty arises because firms do not know how investors will in-
terpret the firm’s private information. The example they refer to in their paper
is on the disclosure of order backlog. On one hand, investors can interpret a
high-order backlog positively if they believe that it signals that the demand
for the firm’s product is high. On the other hand, a high-order backlog can
be interpreted negatively by investors if they believe that it “signals problems
with the firm’s production facilities or a manager’s lack of control over oper-
ations”. In terms of the current story, the disclosure of the signals (that is,
the disclosure that the firm has invested in a new product) may be interpreted
favorably by the market in that it signals growth and innovation within the
firm through newer and more improved products. Alternatively, such news
may be interpreted unfavorably as the market views the investment as a costly
and risky venture with little chance of success.
We further assume that all disclosures are (ex post) verifiable; that is, a
manager will not issue misleading information in an attempt to alter the mar-
ket’s perception of his firm’s prospects. Stocken [19] examines in detail the
credibility of a manager’s disclosure of privately observed nonverifiable infor-
mation. His main finding is that a manager will almost always endogenously
truthfully disclose his private information because if the market perceives lack
of credibility in the disclosure, it will ignore it and this can lead to deeper
problems for the firm in the future. The credibility could also be interpreted
from the manager’s reputation perspective. According to a study conducted
by Graham et al. [10], executives believe that a reputation for not consistently
providing precise and accurate information can lead to the under-pricing of
the firm’s stock.
In this model, disclosure is costly and this cost cannot be recouped once
the disclosure option has been exercised. For example, there may be some
direct costs associated with producing and disseminating information; that is,
information may need to be disclosed or certified by a third party such as an
accounting firm. Note that these costs are direct and do not relate to the (indi-
rect) proprietary costs that are typically referred to in the disclosure literature
such as the cost of revealing firm sensitive information to competitors. There
also exists an exogenous opportunity cost of waiting for more, and possibly
better, information signals to arrive. By waiting for further signals, the man-
ager can be more certain of the overall profitability of the firm (owing to the
new investment), which will reduce the likelihood of misinforming the market
and thereby damaging his reputation. These costs of announcing the informa-
tion, and therefore exercising the disclosure option, could greatly outweigh the
benefit of disclosure.
We assume throughout that a fraction of the firm is owned by the manager.
Therefore, the manager’s compensation depends upon the firm’s activities, and
as such, he is compensated with a fraction of the option to disclose. Note
that if the manager’s compensation does not depend on the disclosure option
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itself, the manager should not have any preference for the timing of disclosure.
Assuming that the manager’s preferences are quasi-linear in his share in the
firm’s value we can assume the manager to maximize firm value. In this way,
the incentives of the manager are aligned with those of a shareholder whose
only aim is to maximise firm value. This is consistent with the typical principal-
agent set-up of Mas-Colell et al. [15].
2.2 Model Set-up
We assume that the firm has invested in a project and receives (private) in-
formation regarding the project’s profitability. The manager has, at any time,
the option to voluntarily disclose the information at a sunk cost I ≥ 0. The
manager is uncertain about market reaction to the disclosure. The market re-
action to the disclosed information can be either good (γ = 1) or bad (γ = 0)
resulting in a change in firm value of V P > I or V N < 0, respectively. Over
time, the manager receives information, the arrivals of which follow a Poisson
process with parameter µ > 0. Information is interpreted by the manager as
either increasing the likelihood of a positive market response or decreasing it.
Each batch of information, however, is an imperfect signal which reflects the
true market reaction with probability θ ∈ (1/2, 1).1 In this set-up, the number
of signals indicating a positive market reaction net of the number of signals
indicating a negative market reaction is a sufficient statistic for the manager’s
optimal disclosure policy. At time t this number of signals is denoted by st ∈ Z.
Under the assumptions regarding the arrival and precision of information it
can be shown that st evolves over time according to (cf. Thijssen et al. [23])
dst =

1 w.p. [1(γ=1)θ + 1(γ=0)(1− θ)]µdt
0 w.p. 1− µdt
−1 w.p. [1(γ=1)(1− θ) + 1(γ=0)θ]µdt.
(1)
Suppose that the manager has a prior over the probability of a positive market
reaction equal to p0 ∈ (0, 1). If, at time t ≥ 0, the manager observes st, then his
posterior probability of a favorable market response follows from an application
of Bayes’ rule (see Thijssen et al. [23]):
pt := p(st) =
θst
θst + ζ(1− θ)st , (2)
where ζ = (1− p0)/p0 is the prior odds ratio. Note that pt is a monotonically
increasing function in st, and that the inverse function is given by
st := s(pt) =
log
(
1−pt
pt
)
− log(ζ)
log
(
1−θ
θ
) . (3)
1This assumption is made without loss of generality. A choice of θ = 12 implies that the
signal is pure noise, since the initial prior is not revised. Furthermore, a choice of θ = 0.2 is
as informative as a choice of θ = 0.8 since the same analysis may be carried out for 1− θ.
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This implies that we can either work with the number of net signals or the
posterior belief. In the following we use both approaches intermittently, de-
pending on analytical convenience.
If the manager discloses the information at time t ≥ 0, then, conditional
on the prior p0, the expected change in the firm’s value equals
U(st) := p(st)V
P + (1− p(st))V N − I. (4)
Assuming that the manager discounts future payoffs at a constant rate r > 0,
his problem can be formulated as an optimal stopping problem,
U∗(st) = sup
τ≥t
Et
[
e−rτU(sτ )
]
, (5)
where Et denotes the expectation conditional on all information available up
to and including time t, and the supremum is taken over stopping times.
Problem (5) has an analytical solution, which takes the form of a threshold
policy: the manager should disclose the information as soon as the posterior
belief exceeds a certain threshold belief p∗. Adapting the arguments in Thijssen
et al. [23] to our setting, this threshold can be shown to be given by (see
Appendix A for details)
p∗ =
[
V P − I
I − V NΠ+ 1
]−1
, (6)
where
Π =
(
β1(r + µ)− µθ(1− θ)
)(
r
µ
+ 1− θ
)
− µθ(1− θ)β1(
β1(r + µ)− µθ(1− θ)
)(
r
µ
+ θ
)
− µθ(1− θ)β1
(7)
and β1 > θ is the larger (real) root of the quadratic equation
Ψ(β) ≡ β2 −
(
r
µ
+ 1
)
β + θ(1− θ) = 0. (8)
Note that there is no guarantee that there exists an integer s such that p∗ =
p(s). In other words, the optimal disclosure threshold in terms of net signals
can be any real number. Since signals are integers this implies that the manager
should wait until the posterior probability, driven by (2) exceeds p∗. In other
words, the disclosure threshold in terms of net signals is s∗ = ds(p∗)e.2
3 Properties of the Optimal Disclosure Policy
In this section we provide an insight into the main features that emerge from
the manager’s disclosure policy. The following proposition shows that the pol-
icy under the current (real options) approach gives a more stringent criterion
2For s ∈ R, ds(p∗)e := min{k ∈ Z+|k ≥ s}.
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on disclosure than the classical NPV approach demands; that is, the manager
will wait longer before disclosing than under the NPV approach. The more
stringent criteria is supported by Dixit and Pindyck [5], and the reasoning is
that the classical NPV approach does not incorporate the opportunity cost of
waiting for more informative signals to arrive through exercising the option
immediately.
The manager’s belief threshold under the classical NPV rule (disclose at
the first time when the PV exceeds the cost of disclosure) is given by
pNPV =
I − V N
V P − V N . (9)
The proof that p∗ > pNPV proof can be found in Appendix B.
Proposition 1. The real options approach leads to a well-defined threshold
probability, p∗, and requires a more stringent criteria on the timing of disclo-
sure than the classical NPV approach would demand.
The result of a comparative static analysis of the threshold, p∗, with respect
to the model’s key economic variables is given in the following proposition, the
proof of which is obtained through simple calculus and is, therefore, omitted.
Proposition 2. The threshold belief in a positive market response, p∗, de-
creases with V P and V N , and increases with I.
These results are intuitive and are driven by the manager’s policy to max-
imize firm value.
Similar to our paper, Suijs [21] shows that the unraveling argument leading
to full disclosure need not apply when the firm is uncertain about investor
response. In that paper, the firm’s objective is to acquire as much of the
investor’s capital as possible. He assumes that the investor can invest in the
firm, a risk-free asset, or some alternative risky investment project. While we
do not make this assumption directly, implicit in our set-up is that any profit
from disclosure is obtained through acquiring capital investment when the
response to the disclosed information is positive. A lack of information may
induce investors to opt for alternative investment opportunities. Therefore,
the greater the impact an announcement will have on the positive value of
the firm, that is, the higher V P , the less time the manager will wait before
he exercises his option to disclose the information. This is consistent with
Suijs [21] who finds that a stronger positive response makes disclosure a more
attractive option (relative to non-disclosure) and, therefore, the firm can be less
certain about the market reaction being positive for disclosure to be optimal.
Conversely, the greater the impact an announcement will have on a neg-
ative trading response, that is, the lower V N , the longer the firm will wait
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before making a disclosure. Unlike Thijssen et al. [23], V N 6= 0, and therefore,
if the investors learn of bad news about the firm’s stock, they will sell off some
of their shareholdings and this lowers the valuation of the firm. Thus, it is
straightforward to see why the firm conceals information that is likely to have
a strong negative impact on the stock price. This is again corroborated by
Suijs [21] who points out that a stronger negative response makes disclosure
less attractive compared with nondisclosure, and thus, the firm must be more
certain about being a good firm for disclosure to be optimal. However, if the
news is unlikely to have a very strong negative impact, the manager will be
more likely to disclose the information to prevent the market from inferring
that the firm is in a worse state than it actually is. Graham et al. [10] con-
duct a comprehensive survey that asks CFOs to describe their choices related
to reporting accounting numbers and voluntary disclosure and find that one
advantage for releasing bad news is that it can help a firm to develop a repu-
tation for providing timely and accurate information. CFOs place a great deal
of importance on acquiring such a reputation: 92% of their survey respondents
believe that developing a reputation for transparent reporting is a key factor
motivating voluntary disclosures.
The greater the cost of making an announcement, the longer the manager
chooses to wait before making an announcement. This is owing to the fact that
if the (direct) costs of, say, preparing or disseminating information are high,
the manager requires more time to confirm the accuracy of the information
signals. By so doing, he obtains a stronger conviction about how the market
will react to the news and the likelihood of making a wrong disclosure decision
is reduced.
The comparative static result with respect to signal quality suggests that
the more informative are the signals, the longer the manager will wait before
disclosing his information; that is, the higher θ, the higher p∗. The proof of
the following proposition can be found in Appendix C.
Proposition 3. The threshold belief in a positive market response, p∗, in-
creases with θ.
In the context of our model, the more informative are the signals, the less
uncertainty the manager has regarding the impact from his disclosure choice.
However, the comparative static result with respect to θ appears to be at odds
with the intuitive and, indeed, widely accepted result in real options literature,
that an increase in uncertainty should have an inhibiting effect on disclosure. In
other words, standard results (Dixit and Pindyck [5], McDonald and Siegel [16],
etc.) imply that we would expect that the more informative are the signals,
the earlier disclosure will occur. However, in the standard framework, all of
the uncertainty inherent in the model is captured by one parameter, namely
the variance, whereas in our model, the uncertainty arises not only through the
quality of the information signal, θ, but also through the (random) arrival times
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of the information signals, µ, and more specifically, the manager’s uncertainty
regarding how the market will interpret the information if disclosed. This latter
effect is a latent variable, and thus cannot be measured. While a higher quality
signal will reduce the manager’s uncertainty as to the likely market response,
for reasons discussed in Section 2.1, it will never be eliminated entirely. It
is the combination of these effects that drive the uncertainty in this model
and thus, obtaining an unambiguous conclusion on what the uncertainty effect
should be is not trivial.
In order to understand why a negative relationship exists between the infor-
mation quality of signals and the optimal disclosure threshold, p∗, we examine
the probability that disclosure will take place (i) when the true state of the
world is a negative market response and (ii) when the true state of the world
is a positive market response. An increase in this probability corresponds with
a lower disclosure threshold. Our reasoning for examining the probability of
disclosure is motivated by Sarkar [18] who suggests that in order to gauge the
overall effect of uncertainty on the level of investment, one can look at the
probability that investment will take place within a specified time period. We
note, however, that Sarkar [18] examines the investment-uncertainty relation-
ship for the standard real options model where uncertainty is constant over
time.
Firstly, we assume that the true state of the world is a negative market
response (γ = 0). The probability that the threshold, s∗, is reached, and thus
that the manager will disclose is given by
P (s
∗)(st) :=
(
θ
1− θ
)st−s∗
, (10)
where st < s
∗ The derivation of this result is outlined in Thijssen et al. [23].
Since st < s
∗, the probability of disclosure decreases when the quality of the
signals increases. Intuitively this is sensible: if the true state of the world
is a negative market response and if the signal quality is high, implying the
manager is obtaining accurate, but negative signals, the likelihood he will
disclose quickly decreases and the disclosure threshold, p∗, will be higher.
On the other hand, if the true state of the world is a positive market
response (γ = 1), the probability that the manager will disclose before a finite
time T is given by
P˜ (s
∗)(st) :=
∫ T
0
fs∗(t)dt, (11)
where fs(t) is the unconditional density of first passage times and is given by
fs(t) =
(
θ
1− θ
)− st
2 st
t
Ist
(
2µ
√
θ(1− θ)t
)
e−µt. (12)
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Ist(·) denotes the modified Bessel function with parameter st (see Thijssen
et al. [23] and Feller [9]).
We demonstrate in Figure 1 that this probability is an increasing function
of θ.3 Hence, when the true state of the world is a positive market response,
and the information quality is high, the probability that disclosure will occur
increases, or equivalently, fewer positive (over negative) signals are required to
make disclosure an attractive option. This is intuitive.
0.55 0.60 0.65 0.70 0.75 0.80
Θ
0.85
0.90
0.95
1.00
P

Figure 1: Probability of disclosure for γ = 1.
However, concerning the comparative statics with respect to θ, Proposi-
tion 3 asserts that p∗ increases in θ. This arises from the fact that for certain
combinations of θ with the other parameter values, a low value of s∗ can be
associated with a high value of p∗ (see Figures 2 and 3), that is, the threshold
belief is reached after fewer positive signals have been obtained. This can oc-
cur if, for example, one highly accurate and very positive signal is obtained. st
will only change by +1, but the likely impact of such information on the firm’s
value through a positive market response may be so strong that the manager’s
belief variable pt will “jump” upwards by an amount such that p
∗ is reached.
Finally, it is possible to say something about the frequency of information
arrival on the optimal disclosure policy. Unfortunately, it is not possible to
determine the direction of the relationship between p∗ and the arrival rate, µ,
unambiguously. Therefore, we use numerical simulation results to ascertain
the direction of the relationship. From Figure 4, we see that p∗ is increasing in
the arrival rate (for one set of parameter values). We repeatedly carried out
these computations for a wide range of parameter values, and can confirm that
this result is robust to a wide choice of values. Hence, for reasonable parameter
values, we can conclude that p∗ increases in µ which, in turn, implies that it
decreases in the expected time between signal arrivals.4
3The parameterisation is as follows; V P = 15, V N = −10, I = 5, r = 0.04 and µ = 4.
This parameterisation is used for all figures in this chapter, unless otherwise stated.
4Dixit and Pindyck [5] show that E[T ] =
∫∞
0
µTe−µT dT = 1µ .
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Figure 2: Comparative statics for p∗
with respect to θ
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Figure 3: Comparative statics for s∗
with respect to θ
Einhorn and Ziv [8] examine corporate voluntary disclosures in a multi-
period setting. They conclude that inter-temporal dynamics occur because a
firm’s use of their private information is assumed to be history dependent.
2 4 6 8 10
Μ
0.85
0.90
0.95
p*
Figure 4: Comparative statics of µ with θ = 0.6 and r = 0.04, fixed.
Their multi-period model demonstrates that by providing current disclo-
sure, the manager increases the firm’s implicit commitment to provide similar
disclosures in the future. Thus, in the absence of disclosure, the market is
likely to infer that the manager possesses negative information which they
consider too unfavourable to disclose and will consequently revise down their
expected valuation of the firm accordingly. Our model supports their result,
and goes a step further by showing that in the absence of disclosure as a direct
consequence of receiving few, or no, signals (as opposed to receiving bad infor-
mation), the manager will opt to disclose at a lower threshold in an attempt to
temper the market’s uncertainty and to prevent it from inferring that the firm
must be withholding some negative information. The result is further sup-
ported by anecdotal evidence. Graham et al. [10] find that executives believe
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that lack of clarity, or a reputation for not consistently providing timely and
accurate information, can lead to under-pricing of a firm’s stock. Their survey
evidence suggests that 48.8% of CFOs use voluntary disclosures to correct an
undervalued price. Moreover, Healy and Palepu [13] observe that managers
use corporate disclosures to reduce the likelihood of undervaluation.
4 Debt and Voluntary Disclosure
In this section we present an example of a situation where the Modigliani–
Miller theorem on the irrelevance of capital structure is violated. In practice,
exceptions to the theorem are widely observed in many areas of finance. With
respect to the current setting of disclosure theory, Ahmed and Courtis [1]
conduct an empirical study on factors affecting the level of voluntary disclo-
sure using leverage as an explanatory variable. In particular, they show that
companies with capitalisation structures showing higher proportions of fixed
interest securities relative to equity are significantly associated with the release
of higher quantities of informational disclosure.
Similar to Sabarwal [17], we adopt ideas regarding value of waiting from real
options theory, and show that if a disclosure option resides with the manager,
his optimal disclosure strategy is affected by the form of capital structure. In
particular, our main finding corroborates with Ahmed and Courtis [1] in that
the amount of information disclosed is positively related to leverage. While
they assert that this leverage-based association may be related to corporate
size, in that larger companies tend to use proportionally higher amounts of
fixed interest securities as a financing technique because of the tax advan-
tages, our reasoning is owing to the lower downside risk afforded by limited
liability. However, their assertion of corporate size is only one explanation for
the observed link, and this is owing to their choice of explanatory variables.
However, adopting a broader interpretation of their result, there is nothing to
suggest that limited liability does not play a part in establishing this causa-
tion in their setting, and thus, my model may provide an adequate theoretical
explanation for their empirical result.
In terms of adapting the benchmark model, we consider how the manager’s
disclosure policy is affected when some of the sunk costs associated with dis-
closure are financed with debt. As in Section 2, we assume that the manager is
compensated via stock options and that he is given complete discretion about
the disclosure policy he adopts.
Typically, it may not be realistic to assume that some of the disclosure costs
are financed with debt since the relative magnitude of such costs are too small
to warrant such an assumption as being plausible. However, the disclosure
aspect of whether to reveal the news about the project is still a contributor to
the overall project’s profitability through V P , V N , and I, and thus disclosure is
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simply a compound option (an option problem within a bigger option problem)
which is beyond the scope of this section. If there is an injection of debt which
generally funds the project’s sunk costs, some of which are obviously made
up of the sunk disclosure costs, then in that sense, debt is, at least partially,
funding the disclosure. The idea for the coupon rate is similar; that is, part of
the payoff from disclosure, if impact is V P , is used to repay the debt via the
coupon payment and if impact is V N then none of the disclosure payoff goes
toward the debt obligation.
The main reason for the association between debt and disclosure relates to
the manager-lender conflict. Without debt, in an all equity firm, the manager
incurs both upside and downside risk from making a disclosure. However, with
debt, the manager’s downside risk is limited, in that some of the sunk costs of
disclosure are covered, and the lender is assumed to have first claim on revenues
obtained from disclosure up to a fixed coupon, C, which the lender determines
(this assumption is consistent with Sabarwal [17]). This may provide the man-
ager with ex post incentives to make decisions that are not in the lender’s best
interest. For example, the manager may opt to disclose some negative infor-
mation about the prospects of the firm if he wishes to discourage other players
from entering the market. Recognising this possibility, the lender demands a
higher interest rate on the loan which implies a higher coupon payment.
The manager’s objective is still to maximise his (discounted) expected util-
ity from wealth, which is equivalent to maximising firm value owing to the
compensation assumption, and the lender adopts a zero profit condition. The
disclosure problem is then to determine an equilibrium belief level, p∗∗d , such
that, simultaneously, the manager’s and the lender’s objectives are satisfied,
for a given level of debt. We further show how the disclosure policy changes
as the debt level changes.
4.1 Manager’s Problem
The manager gains when the firm’s payoff from disclosure exceeds its debt
obligation, and suffers a loss otherwise. However, he suffers far less damage if
his payoff falls just short, or way short, of the debt obligation, than if all of
the disclosure cost was financed with equity.
Denote by 0 < D ≤ I the firm’s only debt payment. We assume that if
the response to disclosure is negative, and consequently, the impact on firm
value is V N , the firm defaults on its loan; that is, V N − (I −D) < 0. In the
event of a default, the payment to the lender is 0 and the manager suffers by
the amount V N − (I − D) > V N − I. On the other hand, if the response is
positive, the impact on firm value is V P and we assume that the manager can
meet his debt obligation. This implies that V P − (I − D) − C ≥ 0 and the
lender is paid C while the manager retains the residual V P − I +D − C ≥ 0.
14
The expected change in value from disclosure at time t, conditional on p0,
is given by
UD(st) =p(st)(V
P − I +D − C) + (1− p(st))(V N − (I −D))
=p(st)(V
P − C) + (1− p(st))V N − (I −D),
(13)
where p(st) is given by equation (2).
Solving for the optimal threshold, via an optimal stopping approach (see
Appendix A) yields the optimal threshold, when some of the cost is financed
with debt, and this is given by
p∗d =
[
V P − C − (I −D)
(I −D)− V N Π+ 1
]−1
(14)
where Π is given by equation (7). Moreover, (14) is a well-defined probability,
if, and only if, (I −D) ≤ (V P − C), which is satisfied.
4.2 Lender’s Problem
In this subsection, the problem is outlined from the lender’s perspective. Sim-
ilar to Sabarwal [17] (who adapts the more standard model of real options,
(see Dixit and Pindyck [5]; McDonald and Siegel [16]) to include a competi-
tive lending sector), we assume that the lender adopts a zero profit condition.
Hence, he gets C with probability plt and zero otherwise. Thus, his profit is
given by
pilt = pltC −D. (15)
Note that plt denotes the lender’s belief, at time t, about the state of the firm.
The lender acts to attain the zero profit condition implying
p∗l =
D
C
(16)
which is a well-defined probability if, and only if, D ≤ C. This implies that
he will only lend to the firm, to help them finance their disclosure policy, if
he is sufficiently well compensated for the likelihood that the firm will default
on its debt obligation if they adopt a very transparent disclosure policy; that
is, he will only lend to the manager if he is prepared to pay a coupon which
exceeds the amount of debt he is given.
4.3 Equilibrium
For a given level of debt, we want to find a coupon, C∗, such that p∗d = p
∗
l ;
that is, the manager’s belief threshold about when to disclose is equal to the
15
lender’s belief threshold about when to lend. Equating equations (14) and (16)
and solving for the coupon level C∗ yields
C∗ =
D
(
(V P − I +D)Π + (I −D − V N)
)
DΠ+ (I −D − V N) (17)
implying that the equilibrium belief threshold for the manager, and indeed the
lender, is given by
p∗∗d =
[
V P − C∗ − (I −D)
(I −D)− V N Π+ 1
]−1
. (18)
The main findings from an analysis of this equilibrium threshold are given in
Proposition 4 and Proposition 5 below. The proofs are outlined in Appendices
D and E, respectively.
Proposition 4. The equilibrium belief, p∗∗d , is a well-defined probability.
Proposition 5. In equilibrium, the manager will disclose earlier, when some
of the financing comes from debt, than if all of the disclosure was financed with
equity; that is p∗∗d < p
∗. Moreover, the greater the level of debt obtained, the
lower the threshold above which the manager will disclose, in equilibrium.
Firstly considering the manager’s optimal disclosure policy, it has been
shown in Proposition 5 that to the extent that debt reduces the manager’s
disclosure cost the disclosure threshold is lower. This is owing to the fact
that, with debt, the manager is likely to prefer a riskier and more transparent
disclosure policy because his downside risk is limited; that is, the loss he may
incur from a negative response reduces with the level of debt he obtains.
However, on the other hand, to the extent that the lender anticipates the
likelihood that the response to disclosure will be negative, and thus, the man-
ager defaults on his debt, he demands a coupon that compensates him for this
risk. Thus, the manager’s payoff from disclosure decreases in the coupon pay-
ment demanded. Hence, the higher the coupon payment, ceteris paribus, the
longer the manager waits before disclosing as he requires greater conviction
that a positive response will ensue.
Overall, in equilibrium, one might intuitively expect that after compensat-
ing the lender for expected default losses, the net effect of such debt financing
on the optimal disclosure threshold is zero. However, we find that, in fact, the
net effect is negative; that is, the coupon payment demanded is not so high
that the manager requires even greater conviction before disclosing that the
response will be positive than if all his financing arose from equity.
Our reasoning for this result corresponds with that of Sabarwal [17] and is
the following: The disclosure threshold is affected by three main components;
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the manager’s share of the disclosure cost, I − D, the value that goes to the
lender that arises directly from disclosure, and an additional impact of limited
liability. As in Sabarwal [17], “the lender’s zero profit condition implies that
the reduction in the manager’s share of the cost is exactly offset by the value
obtained by the lender”. Therefore, the net effect on the disclosure policy is
the impact of limited liability. With limited liability, some of the downside
risk (that is, the risk of a loss in firm value owing to a negative response to
disclosure) is transferred to the lender, and from the manager’s perspective, his
own lower tail of risk curtailed. According to Sabarwal [17], the non-neutrality
of debt can be motivated in term of the “bad news principle” proposed by
Bernanke [3]. With respect to the current setting, this implies that in the
presence of limited liability debt financing, waiting for more favourable signals
is valuable, but not as much as it is in the standard case, essentially because
adverse realisations to firm value after disclosure (owing to a negative market
response) are marginally less costly for the firm. Hence the manager adopts a
more transparent disclosure policy; that is, the optimal threshold is lower.
5 Conclusion
This research shows how adopting a real options approach can aid our under-
standing of corporate voluntary disclosure. The concept of a disclosure option
is discussed and in this way the corporate disclosure literature is linked to-
gether with the real options literature. The decision to disclose, or withhold,
information is strategic on the part of the firm. This implies that the manager
will only announce the information if he is sufficiently certain that the market
response to the information will have a positive impact on the value of the
firm, and thus, on his own utility from wealth. An analytical expression for
the manager’s threshold belief in a positive market response to the disclosed
information is derived and analyzed using a real options framework. We show
that the approach taken in this paper demands a higher threshold belief in a
positive market response than under the classical NPV approach.
An extension to the model shows that the Modigliani-Miller theorem of
investment financing is violated in the instance of corporate disclosure. When
some of the disclosure cost is financed with debt, the manager adopts a lower
disclosure threshold owing to the limited liability aspect of debt which dom-
inates the loss incurred by the manager through compensating the lender for
expected default losses.
To conclude, there are two points worth noting with regard to relevant is-
sues which are absent in the analysis. The first is that the market for voluntary
disclosure is assumed to be complete; that is, the payoff to the manager from
making a disclosure voluntarily may be perfectly replicated through trading
with existing marketed securities. However, this assumption is at odds with
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reality, and therefore, an examination of the same problem, but under the as-
sumption of incomplete markets, could have an interesting effect on the current
results. The problem in incomplete markets is that there is no unique way to
value the option. A possible way forward here would be to adopt the approach
taken in Thijssen [22]. He views market incompleteness as a case of ambiguity
over the correct way to discount future payoffs. A multiple prior model to-
gether with the assumption of ambiguity aversion leads to a well-defined option
value. In a standard real options setting Thijssen [22] shows that the effect of
market incompleteness is not trivial. It is to be expected that similar results
hold in the case of voluntary disclosure. The second aspect worth noting is
that the manager does not face any competitive pressure whilst deciding on an
optimal disclosure policy. Once again, this assumption is an abstraction from
reality, the examination of which ought to be conducted in further research.
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Appendix
A Derivation of the Optimal Disclosure Policy
The critical value of the conditional belief in a positive market response to
an announcement, denoted p∗ = p(s∗), is the point such that the manager is
indifferent between disclosing the information and withholding it. That is, if
pt > p
∗, the manager is confident that there will be a positive trading response
to the announcement if disclosed. On the other hand, if pt < p
∗, the manager
is not confident enough in a positive response and waits for more information
to arrive.
In order to solve for p∗, the approach taken is to solve the optimal stopping
problem (5) by examining two scenarios. This solution approach is similar
to the approach taken by Jensen [14] and Thijssen et al. [23]. The stopping
value, denoted by U(s) and given by (4), is the expected return to the firm
from disclosing the information to the market immediately. This is the first
scenario examined. The alternative scenario is that it is optimal not to disclose
immediately, but to wait for more signals to arrive. The value of the option,
known as the continuation value, denoted by C(s), represents the discounted
expected value of the next piece of information.
Since there are no cash-flows accruing from the disclosure option, C(·)
should satisfy the Bellman equation over a small interval of time dt, i.e.
C(st) = e
−rdtEt[C(st+dt)]. (A.1)
This equation says that the value of the option at time t should equal its
discounted expected value at time t + dt, where the time interval dt becomes
infinitesimally small. In a small time interval dt, no information is received by
the manager with probability, 1−µdt. On the other hand, information arrives
with probability µdt. If information arrives, the value of the option jumps,
either to C(st + 1) if the information is deemed to signal a positive market
reaction, or C(st − 1) otherwise. Assuming that the current number of net
signals is st (and, hence, that the current posterior belief in a positive market
reaction is p(st)), this implies that (A.1) becomes
C(st) =(1− rdt)
{
(1− µdt)C(st) + µdt
[
p(st)[θC(st + 1) + (1− θ)C(st − 1)]
+ (1− p(st))[θC(st − 1) + (1− θ)C(st + 1)]
]}
+ o(dt).
(A.2)
Substituting for p(st) using (2), dividing by dt and taking the limit dt ↓ 0, we
obtain the following difference equation:
Cˆ(st + 1)− r + µ
µ
Cˆ(st) + θ(1− θ)Cˆ(st − 1) = 0, (A.3)
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where
Cˆ(st) := (θ
st + ζ(1− θ)st)C(st),
Equation (A.3) has a general solution given by
Cˆ(st) = A1β
st
1 + A2β
st
2 ,
where A1 and A2 are constants and 0 < β2 < 1− θ < θ < β1 are the solutions
to the fundamental quadratic
Ψ(β) ≡ β2 −
(
r
µ
+ 1
)
β + θ(1− θ) = 0. (A.4)
So, the value of the disclosure option equals
C(st) =
A1β
st
1 + A2β
st
2
θst + ζ(1− θ)st ,
Imposing several boundary conditions then leads to a solution for the un-
knowns s∗, A1, and A2. First of all, if st → −∞, the probability of the posterior
belief ever reaching p∗ goes to zero and, hence, the option becomes worthless.
So, it should hold that limst→−∞C(st) = 0. Since 0 < β2 < 1− θ this implies
that A2 = 0. A second condition is that the value of the option should be con-
tinuous at s∗. The third boundary condition is another continuity condition
that stems from the realization that the point s∗ − 1 is special. In deriving
C(·) it was (implicitly) assumed that after receiving the next signal disclosure
still does not take place. But, for st ∈ [s∗ − 1, s∗), the manager knows that
if the next signal indicates a positive market reaction, then disclosure should
take place. Denoting the option value in the range [s∗ − 1, s∗) by CU , it can
be shown to be given by
CU(st) =
µ
r + µ
{
[p(st)θ + (1− p(st))(1− θ)]U(st + 1)
+ [(1− p(st))θ + (1− θ)p(st)]C(st − 1)
}
].
(A.5)
So, the value of the disclosure option is
U∗(st) = 1(st<s∗−1)C(st) + 1(s∗−1≤st<s∗)CU(st) + 1(st≥s∗)U(st).
This is a free-boundary problem, for which the constant A1 and threshold s
∗ can
be found by the continuity conditions C(s∗ − 1) = CU(s∗ − 1) and CU(s∗) =
U(s∗). Solving in terms of p∗ := p(s∗) gives
p∗ =
[
V P − I
I − V NΠ+ 1
]−1
, (A.6)
where
Π =
(
β1(r + µ)− µθ(1− θ)
)(
r
µ
+ 1− θ
)
− µθ(1− θ)β1(
β1(r + µ)− µθ(1− θ)
)(
r
µ
+ θ
)
− µθ(1− θ)β1
(A.7)
and β1 > θ is the larger (real) root of the quadratic equation (A.4).
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B Proof of Proposition 1
First, we show that p∗, given by (6), is a well-defined probability.
p∗ > 0 if, and only if, Π > 0, where Π is given by equation (7). If r = 0,
from equation (8), β1 = θ, and Π = 0; i.e. the numerator of (7) is zero. Hence
p∗ = 1 > 0.
Finding the total derivative of the numerator of Π, denoted n(Π), with
respect to r yields:
∂n(Π)
∂r
=
∂n(Π)
∂r
+
∂n(Π)
∂β1
∂β1
∂r
=
1
µ
(
β1(r + µ)− µθ(1− θ)
)
+ β1
( r
µ
+ 1− θ
)
+
∂β1
∂r
(
(r + µ)
(
r
µ
+ 1− θ
)
− µθ(1− θ)
)
This expression is positive since r > 0, β1 > θ and, trivially,
∂β1
∂r
> 0.
Therefore n(Π) > 0.
On the other hand, when r = 0, the denominator of Π, denoted d(Π), is
θµ2(2θ − 1) > 0, since θ > 1
2
by assumption. Furthermore
∂d(Π)
∂r
=
∂d(Π)
∂r
+
∂d(Π)
∂β1
∂β1
∂r
=
1
µ
(
β1(r + µ)− µθ(1− θ)
)
+ β1
( r
µ
+ θ
)
+
∂β1
∂r
(
(r + µ)
(
r
µ
+ θ
)
− µθ(1− θ)
)
> 0.
Therefore d(Π) > 0.
This proves that Π > 0 and p∗ > 0.
p∗ ≤ 1 if, and only if, Π ≥ 0. Indeed, Π ≥ 0, since r ≥ 0, and thus p∗ ≤ 1.
Hence, p∗, given by equation (6), is well-defined.
Moreover, p∗ > pNPV , where pNPV denotes the belief threshold when the
benefits from disclosure are exactly equal to the (direct) costs incurred. Thus
it is obtained by solving for pt when U(st) = 0, such that U(st) is given by
(4). Hence
pNPV =
I − V N
V P − V N . (B.1)
An algebraic manipulation shows that p∗ > pNPV if, and only if,
Π < 1.
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Again, an algebraic manipulation shows that
Π < 1
⇐⇒1− θ < θ,
which is satisfied, since θ > 1
2
.
C Proof of Proposition 3
From equation (6), it is easily obtained that ∂p
∗
∂θ
> 0 if, and only if, ∂Π
∂θ
< 0,
where Π is given by (7).
To determine the sign of ∂Π
∂θ
, one only needs to compare ∂
∂θ
( r
µ
+1− θ) with
∂
∂θ
( r
µ
+θ). Since these derivatives have opposite signs, and β1(r+µ)−µθ(1−θ) >
0, it is indeed the case that ∂Π
∂θ
< 0.
Therefore, ∂p
∗
∂θ
> 0.
D Proof of Proposition 4
It is easily established that p∗∗d , given by equation (18), is well-defined if, and
only if, C∗ ≤ V P − I +D, where C∗ is given by equation (17).
This condition is adhered to when
D
(
(V P − I +D)Π + (I −D − V N)
)
DΠ+ (I −D − V N) ≤ V
P − I +D. (D.1)
Algebraic manipulation reduces the expression (D.1) and C∗ ≤ V P − I + D
holds once
−(I −D − V N)(V P − I) ≤ 0.
This is satisfied since V P ≥ I and I −D − V N > 0, by assumption.
E Proof of Proposition 5
p∗∗d < p
∗ if, and only if,
I − V N
V P − V N <
D
C∗
, (E.1)
where C∗ is given by equation (17).
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After substituting for C∗, an algebraic manipulation reduces this expression
to the condition that (E.1) holds if
Π >
V N − (I −D)
V P − V N +D,
where Π is given by equation (7).
As shown in Proposition 1, Π > 0. Additionally, V N − (I − D) < 0 and
V P − V N + D > 0, by assumption. Hence, the condition is satisfied. Thus,
p∗∗d < p
∗.
It is, therefore, trivially satisfied that
∂p∗∗d
∂D
< 0. If D = 0, p∗∗d = p
∗. For
D > 0, it has just been shown that p∗∗d < p
∗. Hence, p∗∗ decreases in D.
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